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Summary 
 
The effects of voluntary work on earnings have recently been studied for some developed 
countries such as Canada, France and Austria. This paper extends this line of research to Italy, 
using data from the European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) 
dataset. A double methodological approach is used in order to control for unobserved 
heterogeneity: Heckman and IV methods are employed to account for unobserved worker 
heterogeneity and endogeneity bias. Empirical results show that, when the unobserved 
heterogeneity is taken into account, a wage premium of 2.7 percent emerges, quite small if 
compared to previous investigations on Canada and Austria. The investigation into the channels 
of influence of volunteering on wages gives support to the hypotheses that volunteering enables 
the access to fruitful informal networks, avoids the human capital deterioration and provides a 
signal for intrinsically motivated individuals. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
° Department of Economics and Statistics, University of Salerno, via Ponte don Melillo, 84084 Fisciano, 
Salerno, Italy. (brbruna@unisa.it) 
* Department of Business and Economics, University of Napoli “Parthenope”, Via Parisi 13, 80133 
Napoli, Italy. (damiano.fiorillo@uniparthenope.it) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The paper studies the effect of voluntary work on wages for Italian employees. The Heckman and 
Instrumental Variables methods are used in order to control for self-selection bias of participation 
in labour market and endogeneity of volunteering. The results show that a wage premium of 2.7 
percent emerges, when selection and endogeneity problems are taken into account. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Volunteering has attracted economists’ attention mostly because it proves the existence of 
behaviours that do not respond only to economic incentives. Attempts to explain volunteers’ 
choices in the classical optimization framework recognize two fundamental motives for 
volunteering: a consumption motive, stressing that ‘helping others’ is a value in itself, pursued for 
intrinsic or social motivations (self determination and self respect, reputation, adherence to social 
norms); and an investment motive, where unpaid or volunteering activities are performed to gain 
higher future remunerations. Economic models and empirical tests alternatively give prominence 
to the consumption or to the investment hypothesis (Andreoni 1990; Menchik and Weisbrod 
1987). An attempt to reconcile both motivations to volunteering in a unique theoretical 
framework is outlined in Bruno and Fiorillo (2012), where the simultaneous effect of 
consumption and investment motives is empirically tested. Results show that both motives 
interact in shaping regular unpaid labour supply, with consumption motives having a stronger 
influence and a investment motives having a weaker influence. 
The consumption motive is typically tested through correlation between voluntary activities 
and proxies of intrinsic or social motivation. In comparison, the existence of investment motives 
can be supported by evidence on the correlation between volunteering and higher wages: 
volunteers use their available time to invest in future higher wages.  
The wage premium for volunteering can be analyzed by answering three different questions: 
the first is on the existence of a wage premium, the second concerns its size and the third 
investigates why volunteering determines higher wages. The answer to each question entails 
addressing some theoretical and empirical problems, which have been variously considered in 
previous studies. 
When testing for the existence of a wage premium, it is important to take into account the 
potential endogeneity of volunteering. As stated by Day and Devlin (1998, 1184) “Such 
simultaneity may arise via two channels: first, the wage differential between volunteers and non-
volunteers (if it exists) may itself motivate individuals to volunteer; and second, if volunteering is 
a normal good, then individuals with higher incomes may be more likely to volunteer”. In the few 
empirical existing studies, only Hackl et al. (2008) control for potential endogeneity of 
volunteering. 
The size of the wage premium is important in assessing the relevance of the investment 
motives in volunteering. Empirical analyses have revealed a wage premium ranging from 7 to 
18.5 percent. Day and Devlin (1997) find a significant positive wage premium for male 
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volunteers of about 11 percent, but not for women. Using the same data set, Day and Devlin 
(1998) show that, on average, volunteers have about 7 percent higher incomes than non-
volunteers. In contrast, Prouteau and Wolff (2006), do not find a statistically wage premium for 
volunteers in the public sector. Finally, Hackl et al. (2008), using Austrian data, show that on 
average, the wage premium for volunteers is 18.5 percent. The wide range of values suggests that 
a selectivity bias related to the labour force participation may be important (Day and Devlin 
1997): the wage premium could disappear or be reduced as one controls for selectivity bias, but 
none of the previous studies consider the selectivity bias related to the labour force. Other biases 
can influence the wage premium size if the sample is restricted in order to solve problems with 
data availability. Moreover, in all studies, except Prouteau and Wolff (2006), the income data 
may not be in the ideal form, as data on income are available on a household basis and in ranges 
rather than levels. The sample is therefore restricted to households in which the respondent is the 
sole wage earner, assigning the midpoint of his/her net household income as value.  
Answering the third question on wage premium for volunteering means explaining why, if a 
wage premium exists, volunteers gain a higher income in the labour market. Three channels 
through which volunteering may affect earnings have been suggested (Day and Devlin 1997, 707-
708). First, voluntary work may provide individuals with an alternative means of acquiring skills 
and experience that make them more productive (the human capital hypothesis). An accurate test 
of the human capital hypothesis should include as regressors experience in volunteer activities 
and experience in the labour market. Only in Day and Devlin (1998) is data on volunteering 
experience available, while labour experience is mentioned in Hackl et al (2007).  The second 
channel of influence of volunteering on income is in the fact that volunteering may provide a 
signal to employers of otherwise unobservable ability (the screening hypothesis). If the wage 
premium is associated with unobservable characteristics, it should also emerge when a wide set 
of individual and labour market variables is employed. An overestimation of the size of the 
premium can emerge when employing parsimonious sets of regressors. Through the third channel 
volunteering may provide access to informal networks of contacts that can be useful in job search 
strategies (the networking hypothesis). Previous studies show mixed evidence on the relevance of 
this channel.  
This paper tries to answer the three questions stated above on the wage premium for 
volunteers using a sample of Italian employees from the 2006 European Union Statistics on 
Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) dataset. The existence of a wage premium is tested by 
employing the instrumental variable method to account for the causality of the correlation 
between voluntary work and income. To prevent overestimation of the size of the wage premium, 
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we take into account the selectivity bias related to labour force participation. The availability of 
information about earnings for each worker in the sample allows an analysis that is not restricted 
to single-earner households. The paper also discusses the three channels of influence of 
volunteering on wages, considering the role of a wide set of variables, including relational 
variables, and using participation in organizations and informal help as instruments.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 surveys previous empirical 
studies while Section 3 presents the empirical strategy used in this paper to analyze the effect of 
voluntary work on wages. The data and the variables are presented in Section 4. Empirical results 
are shown in Section 5. Section 6 is dedicated to the question about the size of the wage premium, 
whereas Section 7 examines in depth the three channels of influence. Section 8 concludes. 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
In economic literature, empirical studies on the impact of voluntary work on earnings are 
relatively scarce. Since the seminal papers of Day and Devlin (1997, 1998), only a small number 
of studies have analysed the phenomenon, because of the absence of data sets suitable for testing 
the hypotheses. Most empirical studies demonstrate a wage premium.  
Using a Survey of Volunteer Activity conducted by Statistics Canada, Day and Devlin (1997) 
examine whether returns to voluntary work in the paid labour market can explain part of the 
male-female earnings gap. They find a significant positive wage premium for male volunteers of 
about 11 percent, but not for women. The decomposition of earnings differential between 
volunteers and non-volunteers shows that the differential is mainly attributable to differences in 
individual characteristics, both for males and females, in particular because volunteers are better 
educated than non-volunteers. This evidence indirectly supports the screening hypothesis. As to 
the additional returns to individual characteristics, mixed evidence emerges for males and 
females. For males, the wage premium for volunteering is not an additional return of the previous 
characteristics, because it is largely unexplained. Because education is included in the individual 
characteristics, this evidence is not in favour of the human capital hypothesis. For females, much 
of the wage premium for volunteering is associated with a higher return to volunteering 
experience: volunteers with past experience in volunteer activities are rewarded with an 
additional return to their experience in comparison to non-volunteers with the same past 
experience in volunteer activities. This puzzling evidence does not support the human capital 
hypothesis, if past experience in volunteer activities represents an investment in acquiring skills 
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both for volunteers and non-volunteers. It could be reasonable that a ‘motivational’ premium is 
associated with those who constantly continue to volunteer. 
  Using the same data set, Day and Devlin (1998) test directly the human capital hypothesis, by 
considering three alternative measures of volunteering, accounting for past and current 
volunteering. Unfortunately, the experience in volunteering gives no further information on the 
human capital accumulation and their “empirical model is not capable of discriminating 
between… competing explanations” (p. 1190). However, they show that, on average, volunteers 
have about 7 percent higher incomes than non-volunteers.  
Prouteau and Wolff (2006) employ a switching regression model on a French survey to control 
for selectivity bias in the wage equation. Their analysis includes only those who take on 
responsibilities in associations, but all types of associations are considered (from recreational to 
professional), leading to mixed evidence of a wage premium: results do not demonstrate a wage 
premium for volunteers in the public sector, whereas in private sector they find a negative 
premium. Because of these results, they reject the investment motive for volunteering, claiming 
that only consumption motives lead individuals to engage in voluntary activities. But the absence 
of a wage premium can be also the result of some limitations of their analysis. A wide range of 
associations is considered and therefore associations with explicitly leisure purposes, such as a 
golf or tennis clubs, are also included. The authors argument that by focusing only on participants 
with managerial tasks, they implicitly limit the analysis to genuine volunteers, because French 
law prohibits financial compensation for such tasks in associations, other than the reimbursement 
of expenses. The argument is not fully convincing for three reasons. First, compensation can be 
hidden under the label of reimbursement or other benefits and therefore many individuals 
observed may not in fact be unpaid volunteers. Second, the managerial position in the association 
can be the output and not the input of the networking activity, when it represents the additional 
benefit in terms of prestige and social consideration of a working career at the peak of the wage 
profile1. Though it is difficult to think of the president or of the treasurer of a golf club as a 
volunteer, they are probably engaged in networking activities, with investment purposes, oriented 
toward social prestige and not toward higher wages. This intuition is indirectly confirmed by the 
same authors when they find a positive effect of managerial responsibilities in associations on the 
number of gatherings with friends, which they explain as a relational (consumption) motive for 
volunteering, but which could also be a networking (investment) motive. Therefore, when 
                                                           
1
 In the descriptive statistics, a half of associations managers are in the 40-50 age range, which is usually a peak in 
the wage profile. 
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focusing on these ‘volunteer managers’ the wage premium disappears. Third, and probably most 
important, when selecting a subsample of individuals a careful analysis should verify the 
existence of a selection bias: have the association managers self selected themselves in that status? 
It could be that the associations’ managers have a weaker investment motive, because of 
unobservable characteristics, compared to the other association members, and that only for these 
characteristics are they selected for the position. 
 Finally, Hackl et al. (2008), using Austrian data, show that on average the wage premium for 
volunteers is 18.5 percent. Their analysis is devoted to finding support for the investment model, 
and has the advantage of employing multiple dimensions to measure volunteering (the 
dichotomous variable, the numbers of hours individuals volunteer and the number of 
organizations they are engaged in). These multiple dimensions allow the testing of different 
hypotheses of behaviour and considering at once the three channels of influence of volunteering 
on earnings. Results show that number of volunteering hours plays an important role in 
explaining the wage premium, and this evidence is used to confirm the three hypotheses because 
investing more hours in volunteering has three effects: allows accumulation of human capital 
might intensify social contacts within the network, and signal the individual’s willingness to 
perform.  Note that self-selection of volunteers is confirmed in the analysis, strengthening the 
screening hypothesis, whereas the number of organizations one is engaged in has no significant 
impact on wages, weakening the networking hypothesis.    
Summing up, the few studies investigating the wage premium for volunteering give some 
support to the existence of an investment return to volunteering. When this is demonstrated, the 
return to volunteering ranges from 7 percent to 18.5 percent, but it is difficult to discern which 
channel causes the investment return: evidence tends to support the screening hypothesis and to 
reject the human capital hypothesis. 
3. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 
In determining the effect of voluntary work on earnings the basic model to be estimated can be 
written as follows: 
ln Wi = X1iβ1 + α1Vi + µ1i                        (1) 
where Wi denotes the individual hourly wage, X1i is a vector of exogenous individual 
characteristics that are thought to determine earnings, Vi is a dummy variable that takes the value 
 of 1 if the individual supplies voluntary work
estimated while µ1i is a random error term. 
As indicated above, the model may suffer from a type of sample selection problem as it 
ignores the potential bias introduced by 
Working individuals may not be a random sub
systematically different characteristics from those without a paid job. 
exercise an influence not only on the choice to
meaning that labour force participation and volunteering decisions need to be considered when 
modelling an individual’s success
endogenous. If volunteers are individuals with above
higher wages regardless of whether they have acquired any useful skills or contacts through 
volunteering, and thus volunteers’ 
because higher-income individuals are more likely to volunteer (Day and 
In this paper, a double methodological approach is used to estimate the effect of 
work on earnings. First, a self-selection framework 
order to correct for potential sample selection bias. 
technique is employed to account for the endogeneity bias when estimating the effect of 
voluntary work on labour income.
We first start with Heckman techniques. The model consists of 
participation equation and a labour 
Suppose that  is the continuous latent variable associated with the work decision. This can 
be expressed as 
where X2i is a vector containing individual characteristics that influence the decision to enter the 
labour market, β2 is a vector of parameters to be estimated and 
0, the wage market exceeds the reservation wage,
the individual does not work. 
, which takes the value of 1 if the individual works and 0 if the individual does not work.     
 
, and 0 otherwise. β1 and α1 and are parameters to be 
 
the individual’s decision to participate in the labour force. 
-sample of the population as they may have 
These characteristics 
 work but also on volunteering and earnings, 
 in the labour market. Moreover, voluntary work
-average ability, they will tend to have 
wages may be higher than those of non
Devlin 1998
of labour market participation 
Second, the Instrumental Variable (IV)
 
two equations: a labour force 
income equation. 
     = X2iβ2 + µ2i                               (2) 
µ2i is a random error term. If 
 and the individual chooses to work. If 
 is unobservable but depends on the observable binary variable 
 =  
 
8 
may 
 may be 
-volunteers simply 
, 720). 
voluntary 
is employed in 
 
 > 
 ≤ 0, 
 
 Considering the potential bias rel
force, the labour income model can be re
ln W
where β3, α2 and γ1 are parameters to be estimated, 
Ф(X2iβ2) is the inverse Mills ratio for labour force participation equation where 
probability distribution and Ф(.) is the normal cumulative distribution.  
The voluntary work equation is 
         
where  is the latent variable describing the utility gain from volunteering, 
containing individual characteristics that influence the decision to supply unpaid work, 
vector of parameters to be estimated and 
to the observable dichotomous variable, 
voluntary work and 0 otherwise. 
 
The IV technique is a two-step process. The first stage consists 
probability for voluntary work by estimating Eq.
the predicted probability is used to replace
by ordinary least-squares (OLS)
The data for this study come from the European Union Statistics on Income and Living 
Conditions (EU-SILC) dataset. The EU
longitudinal multidimensional data on income, social exclusion and living conditions performed 
in Member States (MS) of the European Community. The reference population of EU
private households and their current heads residing in 
collection. The EU-SILC data is thus a national representative sample of all person
over residing in private households within the country. Four types of data are gathered in EU
ated to the individual decision to participate in
written as 
i = X1iβ3 + α2Vi + γ1λ1i+µ3i                        (3) 
µ3i, is a random error term and 
   
 
 = X3iβ4 + µ4i                                                    (4) 
µ4i is a random error term.  is unobservable but 
, which takes the value of 1 if the individual does 
 
 =  
 
of generating the predicted 
 (4) using a probit model. In the second stage, 
 the  variable in Eq. (3) and the model is 
.  
4. DATA 
-SILC database provides comparable, cross
the territory of the MS at the time of data 
9 
 the labour 
λ1i = ϕ(X2iβ2))/ 
ϕ(.) is the normal 
X3i is a vector 
β4 is a 
linked 
estimated 
-sectional and 
-SILC is all 
s aged 16 and 
-
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SILC: 1) variables measured at the household level; 2) information on household size and 
composition and basic characteristics of household heads; 3) income and other more complex 
variables measured at the personal level, but aggregated to construct household-level variables; 4) 
variables collected at the personal level. The items included in the micro data are related to health, 
education, childcare, housing, demographic and employment characteristics, and income. 
The paper uses the 2006 wave of EU-SILC, which provides information on the labour market 
characteristics of individuals as well as their social participation. The information on social 
participation is self-assessed by the individual, who is asked to report participation in informal 
and formal voluntary activities.  
Our attention is restricted to employees who supply voluntary work in formal organizations. 
The original sample contains 46522 observations. After excluding individuals who were not 
employees, with missing data on labour income and on the number of months spent at work, we 
were left with a subsample of 14567 employees, of whom 1184 were volunteers and 13383 were 
non-volunteers, who were aged between 16 and 64 in 2006. All the variables used in the analysis 
are described in detail in Appendix A. Weighted summary statistics are reported in Table 1. 
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of hourly wages, defined as the net employee 
income divided by the number of hours worked in the reference period. Employee income 
(py010n) is the total remuneration, in cash, payable by an employer to an employee in return for 
work done by the latter during the reference period. The survey reports after-tax income and no 
information on the different tax rates. 
The micro data contain a question, ps150, in which the individual reports if he/she, during the 
last twelve months, has participated in the unpaid work of charitable organizations, groups or 
clubs. The voluntary work dummy takes the value of 1 if the worker has participated in the 
unpaid work of charitable organizations, groups or clubs and 0 otherwise. The voluntary work 
dummy includes only respondents who supply unpaid work, and does not include other 
organisation members who do not perform unpaid work. As in previous studies, the data do not 
provide any information on the number of hours that the individual spent in formal voluntary 
activities.  
A convincing analysis requires that at least one variable in equations (2) and (4) is excluded 
from wage equation (3).  
In order to find instruments for the voluntary work equation (4), the following questions are 
used: if the respondent, during the last twelve months, i) has participated in activities of religious 
organizations (activities related to churches, religious communions or associations) or other 
groups (environmental organizations, civil right groups, neighbourhood associations, peace 
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groups, etc.) (Religious or other groups participation);2 ii) has undertaken (private) voluntary 
activities to help someone, such as cooking for others, taking care of people in hospitals/at home; 
taking people for a walk (Informal Help). The dummy variables are set to 1 if the individuals 
responded “yes”.  
While it seems reasonable that these variables increase the likelihood of supplying voluntary 
work in formal organizations, it is not obvious that they have no effect on earnings. Instrumental 
variables should satisfy two conditions: highly significant correlation with voluntary work 
(strength of the instrument) and no correlation with the error term in the structural equation 
(validity condition). A number of tests can be run in order to check the strength and indirect 
validity of the instrumental variables used for voluntary work and we present these in the 
empirical results. The second requirement for reliable instrumental variables cannot be tested 
directly as it involves a relationship between instruments and the error term. Hence, we rely on 
the following theoretical considerations and intuitions.  
The first variable, religious or other groups participation dummy, concerns participation in 
organizations pursuing ethical, moral or religious aims. Membership and participation in these 
kinds of associations promote coordination and civic culture, and it is reasonable to argue that 
these behaviours affect the probability of engaging in voluntary activities. Furthermore, persons 
attending relational networks are socially integrated and are more likely to hear about volunteer 
opportunities or meet other volunteers (Wilson 2012). The same may not be true for political or 
professional associations and unions: membership in a professional association or union is strictly 
linked to working status and earning function, the same being true for people attending the 
meetings of political parties that may be motivated by lobby interests.  
Religion deserves further consideration. Existing analyses on religion and income concern 
both the effect of religion on income and the inverse relationship. Theoretical explanations 
involve beliefs, opportunity cost of time and network effects. Most studies focus on the 
differences effect between denominations (Jewish, Catholic, Protestant, etc…), whereas other 
studies analyse church membership. The results are positive for the Jewish beliefs and mixed for 
other denominations and for church attendance (Bettendorf and Dijkgraaf 2011). Tomes (1985) 
shows earning differentials by religion, attributable to different returns to human capital. The 
higher return to human capital is generated in stronger family backgrounds in terms of values, 
skills and goals. The same family impact is found in Steen (2004), particularly for Catholics and 
                                                           
2
 The variable includes respondents who participated in religious associations or in other groups (environmental 
organizations, civil right groups, neighborhood associations, peace groups etc). Respondents participating to both 
associations have been excluded.  
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Jews. Note that both analyses focus on the impact of different religious attitudes (and family 
religion) and not of the choice of being religious or not, that is church attendance and/or the 
participation in religious association when one is an adult. It seems that family education is more 
important than the individual choice to participate in a religion: Cornelissen and Jirjahn (2012) 
show that “people who are raised religiously and reject religion as adults are economically more 
successful as they combine a strong internalized work ethic with an increased interest in present 
consumption (as opposed to afterlife consumption)”. Regarding the inverse relationship, Sawkins 
et al. (1997) find a positive relationship between labour income and church attendance using 
micro-data for Great Britain. However, as suggested by Lipford and Tollison (2003), there might 
be a bicausal relation between religion and income when one would consider the endogeneity of 
religion. Lepford and Tollison, using macro-data on the US in a system of equations, find that the 
effect of church membership on income is negative, as is the effect of income on church 
membership, whereas Bettendorf and Dijkgraaf (2011), using micro-data for the Netherlands, 
show that the cross-effects between income and church attendance become insignificant in a joint 
regression model. 
Summing up, previous studies on religion and income focus on different denominations and 
church attendance, and show mixed findings. Our variable of religious participation includes both 
church attendance and other activities related to churches, religious communions or associations. 
Having a wider concept of participation in religious associations, we are confident that our 
variable of “religious participation” is uncorrelated with income, based on the following 
considerations. 
First, religious participation such as church attendance signals an individual preference for 
afterlife consumption: this implies that religious participants place a relatively lower valuation on 
market earnings (Lipford and Tollison, 2003), which is confirmed in the joint regression model of 
Bettendorf and Dijkgraaf (2011). 
Second, the family education effects, which are variable among religions, should be less 
important in Italy where the Catholic religion is clearly prevalent. If family training effects exist, 
they should be uniform and would be captured by the educational variables, through background 
effects.   
The second instrumental variable concerns the informal help variable, which relates to 
activities such as cooking, walking and being with others. Intrinsic motivation that incentives to 
volunteering (Bruno and Fiorillo 2012) also encourages these informal help activities. This 
argument is supported by results in Hank and Stuck (2007), which show a complementary and 
interdependent relationship between volunteering, helping, and caring, supporting notions of the 
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existence of a motivation for engagement. On the other hand, informal help activities do not 
require expensive material goods, and the relationship with income availability can be ignored. 
The opportunity cost of time used to accomplish these tasks is equally irrelevant, because the 
frequency requested is a weekly effort for very easy tasks. 
In order to identify the exclusion variables for the labour force participation equation, we use 
three dummy variables: if the respondent, during the last twelve months, has received a social 
transfer, a disability transfer or a civil disability transfer. In a standard labour supply model, these 
income-support schemes discourage labour force participation and are not included in labour 
income.  
A number of variables are included in the wage equation. These variables are standard in 
empirical applications of the human capital model: demographic characteristics (gender, marital 
status, age, education, family size, number of children, health, homeownership), working 
characteristics (experience, permanent job, change job), firm size, occupation, sector of activity 
and territorial dummies. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
 
                  All sample                                           Volunteers                                     Non volunteers 
Variable           Mean        Std. Dev.          Mean        Std. Dev.      Mean     Std. Dev. 
Voluntary activities 0.08 0.26     
Hourly wage (ln) 2.22 0.50 2.34 0.48 2.21 0.50 
Male 0.58 0.49 0.54 0.50 0.58 0.49 
Married   0.61         0.49 0.60 0.49 0.61 0.49 
Separated 0.02 0.16 0.03 0.18 0.02 0.15 
Divorced 0.03 0.16               0.02 0.15 0.03 0.16 
Widowed 0.01 0.12 0.01 0.11 0.01 0.12 
Low secondary edu 0.31 0.46 0.21 0.41 0.32 0.47 
Secondary edu 0.45 0.50 0.48 0.50 0.45 0.50 
University edu 0.16 0.37 0.27 0.44 0.15 0.36 
Household size 3.13 1.22 2.99 1.19 3.14 1.22 
Children 0 - 2 0.10 0.31 0.05 0.24 0.10 0.32 
Children 3 - 5 0.10 0.31 0.07 0.28 0.10 0.31 
Children 6 - 15  0.35 0.63 0.35 0.63 0.35 0.63 
Children 16 - 24 0.39 0.68 0.38 0.65 0.39 0.70 
Good health 0.74 0.44 0.71 0.45 0.74 0.44 
Homeowner 0.71 0.45 0.79 0.41 0.70 0.46 
Experience 22.93 11.11 23.45 10.72 22.88 11.15 
Permanent contract 0.86 0.35 0.89 0.31 0.86 0.35 
Firm size       
> 10 and < 20 employees 0.16 0.36 0.15 0.35 0.16 0.36 
> 19 and < 50 employees 0.14 0.35      0.17   0.37 0.14 0.35 
0.> 49 employees  0.35 0.48 0.44 0.50 0.34 0.47 
Job-Professional 0.34 0.47 0.48 0.50 0.32 0.47 
Job-Skilled 0.29 0.46 0.27 0.44 0.30 0.46 
Change job 0.10 0.30 0.08 0.28 0.10 0.30 
Agriculture 0.03 0.18 0.02 0.12 0.04 0.19 
Construction 0.07 0.25 0.03 0.17 0.07 0.26 
Wholesale 0.10 0.30 0.06 0.23 0.10 0.31 
Hotels 0.03 0.16 0.02 0.14 0.03 0.17 
Transport 0.05 0.23 0.05 0.22 0.05 0.23 
Finance 0.03 0.18 0.04 0.20 0.03 0.18 
Real estate 0.05 0.23 0.02 0.15 0.06 0.23 
Education 0.09 0.29 0.16 0.37 0.09 0.28 
Public administration 0.10 0.30 0.12 0.32 0.10 0.30 
Health and social work 0.08 0.27 0.15 0.36 0.08 0.26 
Other sectors 0.08 0.27 0.09 0.29 0.08 0.27 
Densely populated area 0.44 0.50 0.41 0.49 0.44 0.50 
Intermediate area 0.39 0.49 0.39 0.49 0.39 0.49 
North East  0.22 0.41 0.28 0.45 0.21 0.41 
Centre 0.20 0.40 0.18 0.39 0.20 0.40 
South 0.19 0.39 0.17 0.37 0.19 0.39 
Islands 0.09 0.29 0.07 0.25 0.09 0.29 
Religious or other groups 
participation 0.18 0.38 0.39 0.49 0.16 0.37 
Informal help 0.08 0.27 0.17 0.38 0.07 0.26 
Professional participation 0.06 0.24 0.18 0.39 0.05 0.23 
Friends 0.50 0.50 0.58 0.49 0.49 0.50 
       
Observation          14567               1184                         13383 
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In the whole sample, the percentage of working individuals who supply voluntary work in 
formal organizations is 8%. Table 1 reports characteristics of volunteers and non-volunteers. 
Volunteers, on average, are older, have higher education, more labour market experience, are 
employed in professional occupations and in large firms, are employed in the public sector and 
live in the north of Italy. Finally, it should be also noted that the average hourly labour income (in 
log) for volunteers is higher than for non-volunteers, i.e. 2.34 and 2.21, respectively. 
5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Column (1) in Table 2 presents the OLS results of the wage function (equation 1) that includes 
the voluntary work dummy variable and all control variables: gender, marital status, years of 
educations, family size, number of children, health, homeowner, experience, permanent job, firm 
size, job professionals and job skilled, change job, sector of activities, municipal and macro-
regional dummies. The coefficient on volunteering is not statistically significant and presents a 
negative sign. Hence, in the wide specification as in Day and Devlin (1998) we do not find a 
wage premium for voluntary work supplied in formal organizations.  
The empirical findings on the other independent variables are generally consistent with 
previous studies. The hourly labour income of males is higher than that of females, and married 
employees have higher hourly wages than single workers. The effect of education is in line with 
expectations: the higher the educational level, the higher the wage premium of an employee. This 
result is in line with findings of Day and Devlin (1998) and Hackl et al. (2007). Moreover, as 
found in Hackl et al. (2007), the more experience of paid work an individual has, the higher their 
hourly wage. 
Unlike the results reported in Day and Devlin (1998) and Hackl et al. (2007), household size 
has a negative effect on hourly wage, statistically significant at 5 percent, while the numbers of 
children aged between 0 and 15 years old have a positive effect on hourly labour income. As in 
Prouteau and Wolff (2006) and in studies following Mincerian approach (Di Pietro, 2007; Strauss 
and de la Maisonneuve, 2009), working for a big firm and in professional/skilled occupations 
results in a higher hourly labour income. The same positive correlation emerges for permanent 
contract, homeowners and the self-perceived good health.  
An additional comment concerns the variable change job, concerning individuals who left a 
job or changed from one job to another since last year. Individuals changing job probably face a 
work interruption, and this circumstance often influences human capital accumulation. Mincer 
and Polachek (1974) incorporated in the earning function exogenous discontinuous labour force 
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participation and numerous studies assess the effects of work interruptions3, especially referred to 
the gender wage gap and the childbearing work interruptions. Two arguments support the decline 
of wage (and of human capital accumulation) after a work interruption: the direct depreciation of 
skills caused by human capital atrophy and the foregone wage growth caused by lost seniority. 
Moreover, it is shown that the rate of depreciation of human capital increases with education 
(Polachek, 2007). If changing job implies a work interruption, the effect of changing job on 
wages is negative because of human capital deterioration. In Column 1 Table 2, the coefficient 
for the status of employee who changed his job is negative and statistically significant at 1 
percent. 
Working in the private sector of transport and finance and in the public sectors entails positive 
wage effects. Finally, the coefficients on territorial dummy variables, which are included to 
capture any macro-regional specific differences in hourly labour income, are consistent with the 
pattern of regional differences in Italy. 
Column (2) in Table 2 presents the estimates for OLS wage function (equation 3) with 
selection correlation on labour force participation4. We find that the coefficient on λ1 is negative 
and statistically significant (1%). This means that there is a self-selection problem. The 
coefficient on voluntary work is still not statistically significant. On the other hand, the results for 
the other explanatory variables are stable and unchanged relative to those reported in Column (1).  
In Column (3) the Instrumental Variable method is used to account for the endogeneity bias5. 
Let us consider the selection term first. The coefficient on λ1 is still statistically significant at 1 
percent with the negative sign. These results corroborate the relevance of accounting for the 
selectivity bias related to labour market participation. As expected, voluntary work has a positive 
effect on labour income. The coefficient on voluntary work is positive and statistically significant 
at 1 percent. The estimate shows that the wage premium for volunteering is 3.3 percent. The 
findings for the other explanatory variables are stable and unchanged compared to those reported 
in Columns (1-2). 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
3
 See Polachek (2008) for a detailed description of mincerian earning function modified for discontinuous labor and 
evidence about the phenomenon.  
4
 The estimates of the selection equation for labour market participation are shown in Appendix B, Table B1. 
5
 The estimates of the voluntary work equation are shown in Appendix B, Table B2 Column (1). 
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Table 2. Estimates of the effect of volunteering on hourly wage 
Note. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity. The symbols ***, **, * denote coefficient  statistically different from 
zero at the 1, 5 and 10 percent. 
 
 
OLS  
(1)  
    OLS 
   (2)  
                IV 
                (3)  
 Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff.  SE 
Voluntary work -0.003 0.012 -0.003 0.012  0.033*** 0.012 
Male  0.112*** 0.008  0.100*** 0.009  0.098*** 0.009 
Married  0.048*** 0.009  0.049*** 0.009  0.051*** 0.009 
Separated  0.040 0.029  0.036 0.029  0.037 0.029 
Divorced  0.017 0.021  0.013 0.021  0.018 0.021 
Widowed  0.015 0.024  0.030 0.024  0.037 0.025 
Low secondary edu  0.086*** 0.016  0.070*** 0.017  0.062*** 0.017 
Secondary edu 
 0.206*** 0.017  0.180*** 0.018  0.166*** 0.020 
University edu 
 0.436*** 0.021  0.400*** 0.024  0.380*** 0.026 
Household size -0.009** 0.004 -0.009** 0.004 -0.007* 0.004 
Children 0 - 2   0.078*** 0.013  0.074*** 0.013  0.079*** 0.013 
Children 3 - 5   0.061*** 0.011  0.055*** 0.011  0.057*** 0.011 
Children 6 - 15    0.046*** 0.006  0.042*** 0.006  0.041*** 0.006 
Children 16 - 24   0.008 0.006  0.010 0.006  0.009 0.006 
Good health   0.020*** 0.008  0.012 0.008  0.014* 0.008 
Homeowner   0.060*** 0.008  0.061*** 0.008  0.056*** 0.008 
Experience   0.010*** 0.000  0.010*** 0.000  0.009*** 0.000 
Permanent contract   0.119*** 0.015  0.117*** 0.014  0.118*** 0.015 
Firm size       
> 10 and < 20 employees   0.031*** 0.010  0.030*** 0.010  0.030*** 0.011 
> 19 and < 50 employees   0.102*** 0.011  0.100*** 0.011  0.099*** 0.011 
.> 49 employees    0.127*** 0.009  0.127*** 0.009  0.124*** 0.009 
Job-Professional   0.184*** 0.010  0.183*** 0.010  0.178*** 0.010 
Job-Skilled   0.119*** 0.010  0.120*** 0.010  0.117*** 0.010 
Change job  -0.068*** 0.015 -0.067*** 0.015 -0.068*** 0.015 
Agriculture  -0.070** 0.029 -0.070** 0.029 -0.056* 0.030 
Construction  -0.005 0.014 -0.004 0.014 -0.000 0.014 
Wholesale -0.049*** 0.013 -0.049*** 0.013 -0.044*** 0.013 
Hotels -0.145*** 0.027 -0.144*** 0.027 -0.145*** 0.027 
Transport  0.063*** 0.014  0.062*** 0.014  0.060*** 0.014 
Finance  0.202*** 0.022  0.201*** 0.022  0.198*** 0.022 
Real estate -0.059*** 0.016 -0.059*** 0.016  -0.048*** 0.017 
Education  0.186*** 0.014  0.187*** 0.014  0.183*** 0.014 
Public administration  0.092*** 0.012  0.092*** 0.012  0.091*** 0.012 
Health and social work  0.049*** 0.014  0.049*** 0.014  0.042*** 0.014 
Other sectors -0.032** 0.015 -0.032** 0.016 -0.038** 0.016 
Densely populated area  0.027*** 0.009  0.032*** 0.009  0.040*** 0.010 
Intermediate area  0.002 0.009  0.003 0.009  0.008 0.009 
North East  -0.008 0.009 -0.006 0.009 -0.012 0.009 
Centre -0.030*** 0.009 -0.029*** 0.009 -0.026*** 0.009 
South -0.092*** 0.011 -0.085*** 0.011 -0.081*** 0.011 
Islands -0.054*** 0.016 -0.045*** 0.016 -0.040*** 0.016 
λ1   -0.041*** 0.014 -0.042*** 0.014 
       
No. of observations                                                            14565 14565  14565  
R-squared                                                                           0.316 0.316  0.316  
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In order to check the strength of the instrumental dummy variables, we run the following test: 
we regress, through a probit model, the voluntary work dummy variable on religious or other 
groups participation dummy variable, informal help dummy variable and all other exogenous 
variables from the voluntary work equation. The coefficients on the instrumental variables are 
significantly different from zero at the level of 1 percent (p-values 0.00 and 0.00) with positive 
signs (see Appendix B, Table B2). The chi-square statistics for joint significance of the 
instruments is 354.47.  
We also test the correlation between our instrumental variables and voluntary work using the 
F-test suggested by Staiger and Stock (1997). The F-statistic for joint significance of the 
instruments in the first stage of the endogenous variable on the instruments and all other 
exogenous variables is 123.63, well above the threshold of 10 suggested by Staiger and Stock 
(1997). Thus, we can conclude that our instrumental dummy variables are not weak. 
The validity condition is indirectly checked using a Sargan test. The residuals from the IV 
estimate are regressed on the instrumental dummy variables and all other exogenous variables. 
The R-squared is extremely small in the regression (0.00004205), indicating that the instruments 
do not explain any significant variations in the residual, suggesting the validity of at least one 
instrument. 
Finally, we also run a Hausman test in order to test the endogeneity of the voluntary work 
dummy variable. The check is performed by including the residuals of the voluntary work 
equation in the OLS wage equation. An F-statistic on whether the coefficient on residuals is 
statistically significant indicates the endogeneity of the voluntary work dummy variable. The 
result shows that the F-statistic in IV estimate is high (6.14), suggesting that the voluntary work 
dummy variable is endogenous. 
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6. THE WAGE PREMIUM SIZE 
The size of the wage premium is important in assessing the relevance of investment motives in 
volunteering. Previous studies have found a wage premium ranging from 7 to 18.5 percent. When 
considering the selection bias problem and the endogeneity issue, the estimate in Column (3) of 
Table 2 shows that the wage premium of volunteering is 3.3 percent, which is a low premium 
compared to previous analyses. Some methodological differences among studies have been 
outlined in the literature review: the availability of data, measures of volunteering and sample 
selection. Furthermore, institutional differences among countries (labour market and non-profit 
sector regulations) can partly explain the variability in results. Nevertheless,  the results in this 
paper are in line with the findings of Bruno and Fiorillo (2012), underlining that in volunteers’ 
behaviour the consumption motive prevails on the investment motive, which is relatively less 
strong in determining choices. 
Consequently, the first problem with our estimates is their comparability with previous 
analyses. The wage premium size may be influenced by country-specific characteristics (e.g. in 
wage structure and productivity), so that it may not be possible to compare the size of the 
premium found for Italian volunteers to those found for others countries: Austria, Canada and 
France.  
To verify the comparability of our results, we report in Table 3 the estimates of wage premium 
on tertiary education performed by Strauss and de la Maisonneuve (2009) on 21 OECD countries 
in the year 2001. We report only the countries of interest: Austria, Canada, France and Italy, 
together with our findings inTable 2 Column (1). 
The coefficients of tertiary education and labour experience show a similar size in all four 
countries, whereas only Canada has different coefficients for individual characteristics (marital 
status and gender). Moreover, our results are in line with the corresponding findings for Italy. 
This comparison seems to suggest that our results can be compared with those from other studies 
in the literature. 
To further test our results on the wage premium size, some considerations about social 
relations and volunteering can be made. If volunteering works as a proxy of social relations, 
volunteering captures the effects of many other networks in addition to the volunteering itself. 
Stylized facts about informal networks show that searching for jobs through friends and relatives 
is generally productive, not only in finding jobs, but also in improving the quality of the match 
between firms and workers. On the other hand, the estimated effects of job contacts on wages 
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vary considerably across studies (loannides and Datcher Loury 2004): recent studies show that 
across many of the countries in the European Union, premiums and penalties present when 
finding jobs through personal contacts are equally frequent and are of about the same size 
(Pellizzari, 2010). 
 
Table 3. Results of the wage regressions of Strauss and de la Maisonneuve (2009) and our findings of Table 2  
 Strauss and Maisonneuve’ results: OLS Our results: OLS               IV 
 Austria Canada France Italy Italy Italy 
female -0.160*** -0.247*** -0.073*** -0.114*** 0.112*** 
(male) 
0.098*** 
(male) 
married 0.037** 0.157*** 0.051*** 0.054*** 0.048*** 0.051*** 
tertiary 0.433*** 0.402*** 0.462*** 0.411*** 0.436*** 0.380*** 
experience 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.010*** 0.009*** 
Note. The symbols ***, ** denote coefficient  statistically different from zero at the 1, and 5 percent. 
 
To investigate if the wage premium size is overestimated by omitting variables concerning 
networks we include in the analysis a dummy variable for participation in professional 
associations, as a proxy of the intensity of social relations. Membership in a professional 
association is strictly linked to working status and to earning function6.  
Taking into account the literature on the effect of networks on wages, by adding the 
professional participation dummy we can investigate if:  
H1 Social connections provide a wage premium (penalty); 
H2 The wage premium for volunteering is overestimated when relational variables are 
omitted. 
Results are shown in Table 4 7 . In the IV model 8 , Column (3), we find a positive and 
statistically significant (at 1%) correlation between wages and the variable participation in 
professional associations. In this framework, the network activities seems to provide a wage  
                                                           
6
 See Appendix A for a description of this dummy variable. 
7
 The estimates of the voluntary work equation with professional participation dummy as additional covariate are 
shown in Appendix B, Table B2 Column (2). 
8
 In Table 3 Column (3), the chi-square statistic for joint significance of the instruments in the voluntary work 
equation is 321.20 (p-value 0.00). The F-statistic for joint significance of the instruments in the first stage of the 
endogenous variable on the instruments and all other exogenous variables is 112.13 (p-value 0.00). Sargant test: the 
residuals from the IV estimate are regressed on the instrumental dummy variables and all other exogenous variables. 
The R-squared is extremely small in the regression (0.00003594). The Hausman test – to test the endogeneity of the 
voluntary work dummy variable – shows a F-statistic in IV estimate of 4.36 (p-value 0.03). 
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Table 4. Estimates of the effect of volunteering on hourly wage, with professional participation dummy added. 
Note. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity. The symbols ***, **, * denote coefficient  statistically different from 
zero at the 1, 5 and 10 percent. 
 
OLS  
(1)  
    OLS 
   (2)  
                IV 
                (3)  
 Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff.  SE 
Voluntary work -0.012 0.012 -0.011 0.012  0.027** 0.013 
Professional participation 0.080*** 0.015  0.080*** 0.015  0.062*** 0.017 
Male  0.110*** 0.008  0.097*** 0.008  0.096*** 0.009 
Married  0.048*** 0.009  0.050*** 0.009  0.051*** 0.009 
Separated  0.039 0.029  0.035 0.029  0.036 0.029 
Divorced  0.017 0.021  0.013 0.021  0.018 0.021 
Widowed  0.017 0.024  0.032 0.024  0.037 0.025 
Low secondary edu 
 0.085*** 0.016  0.069*** 0.017  0.063*** 0.017 
Secondary edu 
 0.205*** 0.017  0.179*** 0.019  0.167*** 0.019 
University edu  0.428*** 0.021  0.393*** 0.024  0.377*** 0.025 
Household size -0.009** 0.004 -0.009** 0.004 -0.008** 0.004 
Children 0 - 2   0.079*** 0.013  0.075*** 0.013  0.079*** 0.013 
Children 3 - 5   0.061*** 0.011  0.056*** 0.011  0.057*** 0.011 
Children 6 - 15    0.046*** 0.006  0.042*** 0.006  0.041*** 0.006 
Children 16 - 24   0.008 0.006  0.009 0.006  0.008 0.006 
Good health   0.018** 0.008  0.011 0.008  0.013 0.008 
Homeowner   0.060*** 0.008  0.061*** 0.008  0.057*** 0.008 
Experience   0.010*** 0.000  0.009** 0.000  0.009*** 0.000 
Permanent contract   0.119*** 0.015  0.117*** 0.014  0.118*** 0.015 
Firm size       
> 10 and < 20 employees   0.030*** 0.010  0.029*** 0.010  0.030*** 0.011 
> 19 and < 50 employees   0.101*** 0.011  0.100*** 0.011  0.099*** 0.011 
.> 49 employees    0.127*** 0.009  0.126*** 0.009  0.124*** 0.009 
Job-Professional   0.181*** 0.010  0.180*** 0.010  0.177*** 0.010 
Job-Skilled   0.119*** 0.010  0.119*** 0.010  0.117*** 0.010 
Change job  -0.068*** 0.015 -0.067*** 0.015 -0.068*** 0.015 
Agriculture  -0.072** 0.029 -0.072** 0.029 -0.056* 0.030 
Construction  -0.006 0.014 -0.005 0.014 -0.000 0.014 
Wholesale -0.049*** 0.013 -0.048*** 0.013 -0.045*** 0.013 
Hotels -0.148*** 0.027 -0.147*** 0.027 -0.146*** 0.027 
Transport  0.061*** 0.014  0.061*** 0.014  0.060*** 0.014 
Finance  0.200*** 0.022  0.199*** 0.022  0.197*** 0.022 
Real estate -0.061*** 0.016 -0.060*** 0.016  -0.051*** 0.017 
Education  0.183*** 0.014  0.184*** 0.014  0.181*** 0.014 
Public administration  0.090*** 0.012  0.090*** 0.012  0.090*** 0.012 
Health and social work  0.042*** 0.014  0.043*** 0.014  0.038*** 0.014 
Other sectors -0.035** 0.015 -0.035** 0.016 -0.039** 0.016 
Densely populated area  0.028*** 0.009  0.032*** 0.009  0.039*** 0.010 
Intermediate area  0.003 0.009  0.004 0.009  0.008 0.009 
North East  -0.008 0.009 -0.008 0.009 -0.012 0.009 
Centre -0.031*** 0.009 -0.030*** 0.009 -0.027*** 0.009 
South -0.096*** 0.011 -0.089*** 0.011 -0.084*** 0.012 
Islands -0.055*** 0.016 -0.047*** 0.016 -0.041*** 0.016 
λ1   -0.041*** 0.014 -0.042*** 0.014 
       
No. of observations                                                            14565 14565  14565  
R-squared                                                                           0.317 0.318  0.318  
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premium. However, by adding a social relations variable, the positive impact of volunteering on 
wages is now statistically significant at 5 percent and reduced in size to 2.7 percent.  
Hence, it seems reasonable to affirm that the impact of volunteering on wages is a little 
overestimated if social relations variables are omitted. It is worth noting that, at this stage, we 
cannot affirm or exclude that volunteering provides higher wages by extending networks, but 
only that the size of the eventual premium is overestimated.  
7. WHY DOES VOLUNTEERING PAY? 
To discern among the three different channels of influence of volunteering on wage some 
further considerations are needed. Three channels through which volunteering may affect 
earnings have been suggested: the networking, the human capital and the screening hypotheses. 
These three channels may or may not coexist.  
To test each channel of influence of volunteering on wages we use a homogenous approach, 
based on the effect of volunteering on wages when changing job. As outlined above, the change 
job variable has a negative impact on wages. If volunteering provides a wage premium, this 
premium should also hold in the circumstances of changing job. The volunteer who changes job 
should therefore face a lower (negative) impact on wages, compared to non-volunteers. To test 
this hypothesis, we use the interaction term between the variable change job and voluntary work, 
in the OLS model.  
Table 5 reports, because of space restrictions, only the findings for the variables relevant in 
this step. Other covariates are stable and unchanged compared to Table 3. Column (1) shows that 
the interaction term change job*voluntary work has a positive sign, reversing the negative impact 
of changing job on wages. This result confirms that a wage premium for volunteering exists, 
because workers changing job gain a wage premium if they perform voluntary work, whereas 
workers changing job who do not volunteer suffer a wage penalty. Note that the voluntary work 
dummy is negative and statistically significant at 10 percent. We interpret this finding as 
evidence of the reverse causality problem. 
This interaction term is also the basis for the analysis in the following section about the 
channel of influence. It is worthwhile noting that we cannot use the interaction term in the IV 
model because of the endogeneity of volunteering. Therefore, the analysis on the channel of 
influence will be conducted in the OLS model, and comments will primarily refer to the sign of 
the interaction terms.  
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Table 5. Testing interaction terms and hourly wages 
Note. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity. The symbols ***, **, * denote that the coefficient is statistically 
different from zero at the 1, 5 and 10 percent. 
7.1 The networking hypothesis 
As shown in the literature, volunteering may provide access to informal networks of contacts, 
but a double relationship between volunteering and social networks could exist: individuals 
volunteer to acquire useful networks, gaining opportunities for better jobs (instrumental relations), 
but individuals may also participate in associations and networks in order to consume relational 
goods (intrinsically enjoyed relations) and consequently to volunteer, as outlined by Prouteau and 
Wolff (2004).  
To directly check the networking channel of influence of volunteering on wages we can test 
the following hypothesis. 
H3. If volunteering provides higher wages because it enables access to informal networks, 
and this also happens when changing job, the negative impact of changing job for a 
volunteer who frequently uses informal networks is lower compared to a non-volunteer. 
 
OLS  
(1)  
OLS 
   (2)  
  OLS 
   (3)  
     OLS 
   (4) 
 
 Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE 
Voluntary work -0.021* 0.012 -0.018 0.012 -0.022* 0.012   -0.016 0.012 
Professional 
participation 0.081*** 0.015  0.078*** 
0.015 
 0.080*** 0.015 0.077*** 0.015 
Change job -0.075*** 0.016 -0.063*** 0.023 -0.084*** 0.030 -0.059*** 0.018 
Change job*voluntary 
work 0.102** 0.049    
  
 
Change job*friends   -0.019 0.031     
Change job*Voluntary 
work*friends   0.122** 
0.059 
 
  
 
Friends   0.003 0.007     
Change job*experience     0.089 0.001   
Change job*Voluntary 
work*experience     0.006** 
0.002  
 
Experience     0.009*** 0.000   
Change job*public 
sector      
 -0.058 0.037 
Change job*Voluntary 
work*public sector      
 0.143** 0.066 
Public sector       0.107*** 0.010 
      
  
 
All control variables Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
      
  
 
λ1 -0.041*** 0.014 -0.040*** 0.014 -0.040*** 0.014 -0.041*** 0.014 
      
  
 
No. of observations                                                            14565 14565  14365 14365 
0.314 R-squared                                                                           0.318 0.320  0.318 
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To test this hypothesis, we use the interaction term between the variables change job, 
voluntary work and friends in the OLS model. The friends variable is a dummy equal to 1 if the 
worker meets friends every week during a typical year and 0 otherwise. 
Table 5 Column (2) shows that the interaction term change job*voluntary work*friends has a 
positive sign, reversing the negative impact of changing job on wages, whereas the interaction 
term change job*friends is not significant. This implies that informal relations arising from 
meeting friends are not significant for those who change job, unless they are volunteers: informal 
relations represented by friends provide higher wages only if they are associated with the status 
of volunteer. This finding seems to support the idea that volunteering provides higher wages 
because it enables access to informal networks.  
7.2 The human capital hypothesis 
The human capital hypothesis underlines that volunteers acquire skills and experience and 
become more productive. It is difficult to test directly the human capital hypothesis because, as 
stated by Day and Devlin (1998, p. 1183-1184), “volunteer work is already incorporated in the 
basic human capital framework, since it can be viewed as one component of an individual's 
experience”. Consequently, when individual experience is measured by an individual's age minus 
years of schooling minus six, as in our estimates, it should still incorporate the human capital 
accumulation through volunteering. Nevertheless, this measurement of human capital 
accumulation fails to consider the effects of discontinuous labour force participation. Work 
interruptions produce human capital deterioration because of the direct depreciation of skills 
caused by human capital atrophy and the foregone wage growth caused by lost seniority 
(Polachek 2007). 
Individuals changing job probably face a work interruption, and volunteering can provide a 
chance to reduce (or remove) the disadvantage caused by lost seniority and atrophy by employing 
herself in volunteering activities in order to acquire new experiences and competences. 
To directly check the human capital effect, we test the following hypothesis. 
H4. If volunteering also provides human capital accumulation when changing job, the 
positive effect of one more year of experience is not reduced when volunteers face work 
interruptions. 
To test this hypothesis, we use the interaction term between the variables change job, 
voluntary work and experience in the OLS model.  
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Table 5 Column (3) shows that the interaction term change job*voluntary work*experience 
has a positive sign, reversing the negative impact of changing job on wages, whereas the 
interaction term change job*experience is not significant. This implies a small positive effect of 
one more year of experience for volunteers who change job, supporting the idea that volunteering 
provides a way to avoid the human capital deterioration.  
7.3 The screening hypothesis 
The third channel of influence of volunteering on wages emphasises that volunteering may 
influence earnings by providing a signal to employers of otherwise unobservable abilities. This 
hypothesis implies that the wage premium is associated with unobservable characteristics, which 
individuals signal to the employer through volunteering.   
The literature underlines that the most important unobservable characteristic of volunteers is 
their intrinsic motivation: people volunteer because they enjoy doing so intrinsically. When 
considering the role of intrinsic motivation, it is useful to distinguish between intrinsic motivation 
in the main job and intrinsic motivation in other activities (such as volunteering). The impact of 
intrinsic motivation in the main job on wages is still debated. The donative-labor hypothesis 
predicts that wage earners will accept lower pay if they find intrinsic value in their jobs. On the 
other hand, Becchetti et al. (2013) show that the negative effect on wages is “dominated by the 
effect by which intrinsic motivations cause or are a signal of higher productivity”. In this second 
effect, the intrinsic motivation in the main job is an individual characteristic associated with 
higher productivity. In what follows, we will interpret motivation as a signal of higher 
productivity, because, when testing the screening hypothesis, it is essential that performance in a 
specific activity (volunteering) is a good signal for performance in other activities (job). 
The literature on Public Service Motivation (PSM) shows that individuals are often attracted to 
public sector by the intrinsic rewards that the sector offers, as the mission of the sector (Dixit 
2002; Besley and Ghatak 2005). The empirical evidence supporting this mechanism (Steijn, 2008; 
Gregg et al. 2011) has found that this is especially true for the higher education sector and the 
health service (Georgellis et al. 2011).  Furthermore, volunteering in these sectors increases the 
likelihood of supplying regular unpaid work (Bruno and Fiorillo 2012).  
On the one hand, workers in the public sector are intrinsically motivated; on the other hand, 
intrinsically motivated individuals supply unpaid labour in education and health sectors more 
frequently. On this basis, the public sectors can be used as proxies of intrinsically motivated 
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individuals, and volunteering can be the way to signal to an employer this motivation. We will 
therefore test the following hypothesis. 
H5. If volunteering provides a wage premium, also when changing job, because it is a 
signal for intrinsically motivated (and more productive) individuals, the wage premium 
for is not reduced for volunteers working in the public sector compared to volunteers 
working in other sectors, when changing job.  
To test this hypothesis, we use the interaction term between the variables change job, 
voluntary work and public sector in the OLS model. The dummy public sector is equal to 1 for 
those working in education, health and public administration, and 0 otherwise. 
Table 5 Column (4) shows that the interaction term change job*voluntary work*public sector 
has a positive sign, reversing the negative impact of changing job on wages, whereas the 
interaction term change job*public sector is not significant. This finding seems to support the 
idea that volunteering provides a wage premium because it is a signal for intrinsically motivated 
individuals. 
8. CONCLUSIONS 
The effects of voluntary work on earnings have recently been studied for some developed 
countries such as Canada, France and Austria. We extend this line of research for Italy, using data 
from the 2006 wave of European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) 
dataset. Three questions about wage premium for volunteers are investigated: whether a wage 
premium exists, how large it is, and through which channel volunteering determines higher wages.   
A double methodological approach is used in order to control for unobserved heterogeneity: 
Heckman and IV methods are employed to account for unobserved worker heterogeneity and 
endogeneity bias. 
Empirical results show that a wage premium of 3.3 percent emerges when the reverse causality 
problem is taken into account. Consequently, the wage premium in Italy is quite small if 
compared to previous investigations in Canada and Austria. Methodological differences and 
country-specific institutional arrangements can partly explain this gap in the results. Further 
analysis would be welcome on this issue. 
The size of the wage premium is important in assessing the relevance of the investment 
motives in volunteering. We suggest that, if volunteering is a proxy of social relations, 
volunteering captures the effects of many other networks in addition to volunteering itself. In the 
Italian data, social connections have a positive correlation with wages (H1), and therefore the 
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wage premium for volunteering can be overestimated if relational variables are omitted (H2). By 
adding a social relations variable, the positive impact of volunteering on wages is reduced in size 
to 2.7 percent.  
Finally, our investigation into the three different channels of influence of volunteering on 
wages gives support to the existence of all three alternatives. We find that workers incurring work 
interruptions, because of job change, suffer a wage penalty, but this penalty disappears for 
volunteers. This happens because volunteering enables access to fruitful informal networks (H3), 
because an individual can reduce (or remove) the disadvantage caused by lost seniority and 
atrophy by employing herself in volunteering activities to acquire new experience and 
competences (H4) and because volunteering is a signal for intrinsically motivated (and more 
productive) individuals (H5).  
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Appendix A. Variable definitions 
Variable Description 
Dependent variable 
Hourly wage  (ln) Defined by the net employee income divided by the number of hours worked in the reference 
period (twelve months). 
Key independent variable 
Voluntary work Dummy, 1 if the respondent, during the last twelve months, participated in the unpaid work of 
charitable organizations, groups or clubs. It includes unpaid charitable work for churches, religious 
groups and humanitarian organizations. Attending meetings connected with these activities is 
included; 0 otherwise 
Sample selection and instrumental variables 
Social transfer Dummy, 1 If the respondent, in 2005, perceived a social pension or a social allowance; 0 otherwise 
Disability transfer Dummy, 1 If the respondent, in 2005, perceived a disability pension or a disability allowance; 0 
otherwise 
Civil disability transfer Dummy, 1 If the respondent, in 2005, perceived a civil disability pension ; 0 otherwise 
Religious or other groups 
participation 
Dummy, 1 If the respondent, during the last twelve months, participated in activities related to 
churches, religious communions or associations or other groups (environmental organizations, civil 
right groups, neighbourhood associations, peace groups, etc.); 0 otherwise 
Informal help Dummy, 1 if the respondent, during the last twelve months, undertook every week (private) voluntary 
activities to help someone, such as cooking for others; taking care of people in hospitals/at home; 
taking people for a walk. It excludes any activity that a respondent undertakes for his/her household, 
in his/her work or within voluntary organizations 
Demographic and socio-economic characteristics 
Male Dummy, 1 if male; 0 otherwise. Reference group: female 
Married Dummy, 1 if married; 0 otherwise;  Reference group: single status 
Separated Dummy, 1 if separated; 0 otherwise 
Divorced  Dummy, 1 if divorced; 0 otherwise 
Widowed Dummy, 1 if widowed; 0 otherwise 
Age Age of the respondent between 16 and 64  
Low secondary edu Dummy, 1 if the respondent has attained lower secondary school; 0 otherwise.  Reference group: No 
educational attained and primary school degree 
Secondary edu Dummy, 1 if the respondent has attained upper or post secondary school degree; 0 otherwise. 
University  edu Dummy, 1 if the respondent has attained tertiary education or higher; 0 otherwise 
Household size  Number of household heads 
Children 0 -2 Number of own children ages 0 - 2 years old. Reference group: no children 
Children 3 -5 Number of own children ages 3 - 5 years old 
Children6 - 15 Number of own children ages 6 - 15 years old 
Children16 -24 Number of own children ages 16 and 24 attending school 
Good health Dummy, 1 if the respondent perceives his/her health as good or very good; 0 otherwise 
LADLs Dummy, 1 if the respondent self-assesses his/her health hampered in daily activity by any health 
problem; 0 otherwise 
Homeowner Dummy, 1 if the respondent owns the house where he /she lives; 0 otherwise 
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Variable Description 
Worker characteristics 
Labour experience Number of years, since starting the first regular job, that the respondent has spent at work 
Experience Age minus the years of educations minus six 
Permanent job Dummy, 1 if the respondent has a work contract of unlimited duration; 0 otherwise 
Firm size  
> 10 and <20 employees Dummy, 1 if the number of persons working at the local unit is between 11 and 19; 0 otherwise.  
Reference group: = or  < 10 employees     
>19 and <50 employees Dummy, 1 if the number of persons working at the local unit is between 20 and 19; 0 otherwise.   
> 49 employees Dummy, 1 if the number of persons working at the local unit is equal or more than 50; 0 otherwise.   
Occupation  
Job-Professional Dummy, 1 if the respondent is employed in professional and/or managerial occupation; 0 otherwise;  
Reference group: Job-No skilled 
Job-Skilled Dummy, 1 if the respondent is employed in skilled occupation; 0 otherwise; 
Change job Dummy, 1 if the respondent left a job or changed from one job to another in the last 12 months  
Sector  
Agriculture Dummy, 1 if the activity sector is agriculture: 0 otherwise. Reference group: manufacturing 
Construction Dummy, 1 if the activity sector is construction: 0 otherwise 
Wholesale Dummy, 1 if the activity sector is wholesale and : 0 otherwise 
Hotels Dummy, 1 if the activity sector is hotels and restaurants: 0 otherwise 
Transport Dummy, 1 if the activity sector is transport: 0 otherwise 
Finance Dummy, 1 if the activity sector is finance intermediation: 0 otherwise 
Real Estate Dummy, 1 if the activity sector is real estate: 0 otherwise 
Education  Dummy, 1 if the activity sector is education: 0 otherwise 
Public administration Dummy, 1 if the activity sector is public administration: 0 otherwise 
Health and social work Dummy, 1 if the activity sector is health and social work: 0 otherwise 
Other sectors Dummy, 1 if the activity sector is another sector: 0 otherwise 
Territorial dummies 
Densely populated area Dummy, 1 it the respondent lives in local areas where the total population for the set is at least 50,000 
inhabitants. Reference group: Thinly-populated area 
Intermediate area Dummy, 1 it the respondent lives in local areas, not belonging to a densely-populated area, and either 
with a total population for the set of at least 50,000 inhabitants or adjacent to a densely-populated 
area. 
North East  Dummy, 1 if the respondent lives in North east regions; 0 otherwise.  Reference group: North West 
Centre Dummy, 1 if the respondent lives in Central regions; 0 otherwise 
South Dummy, 1 if the respondent lives in Southern regions; 0 otherwise 
Islands Dummy, 1 if the respondent lives in the Islands; 0 otherwise 
Other covariates  
Transfer  Dummy 1. If the respondent receives a transfer; 0 otherwise 
Savings Dummy 1, if the respondent had savings; 0 otherwise 
Professional participation 
Dummy 1, if the respondent, during the last twelve months, participated in activities related to a 
professional association. It is also included attending meetings connected with these activities. 
Receiving training organised by such association is excluded; 0 otherwise 
Friends 
Dummy 1, if the respondent gets together with friends every week during a usual year; 0 otherwise   
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Appendix B 
Table B1. Labour force participation equation 
Note. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity. The symbols ***, ** denote that the coefficient is 
statistically different from zero at the 1 and 5. 
  
Variable  dF/dx  SE 
Social transfer -0.252*** 0.039 
Disability transfer -0.234*** 0.018 
Civil disability transfer -0.281*** 0.014 
Transfer -0.090*** 0.012 
Savings  0.083*** 0.006 
Male  0.240*** 0.005 
Married -0.116*** 0.007 
Separated -0.009 0.021 
Divorced  0.016 0.021 
Widowed -0.196*** 0.011 
Age 30-39 0.476*** 0.007 
Age 40-49 0.556*** 0.006 
Age 50-59 0.453*** 0.007 
Age 60-64 0.070*** 0.013 
Low secondary edu 0.152*** 0.009 
Secondary edu 0.289*** 0.008 
University edu 0.401*** 0.010 
Household size 0.009*** 0.003 
Children 0 - 2 0.019 0.012 
Children 3 - 5 0.045*** 0.011 
Children 6 - 15  0.002 0.005 
Children 16 - 24 -0.011** 0.005 
Good health  0.089*** 0.006 
LADLs -0.105*** 0.008 
Homeowner -0.044*** 0.007 
Densely populated area -0.067*** 0.007 
Intermediate area -0.017** 0.007 
North East   0.003 0.008 
Centre -0.016** 0.008 
South -0.101*** 0.008 
Islands -0.127*** 0.009 
  
No. of observations                                                                                             46522 
R-squared                                                                                                             0.348 
Log Likelihood                                                                                                 -20776.55 
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Appendix B 
Table B2. Voluntary work equations 
Note. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity. The symbols ***, **, * denote that the coefficient is statistically 
different from zero at the 1, 5 and 10 percent. 
 
 (1) (2) 
Variable   dF/dx                       SE   dF/dx                SE 
Religious or other groups participation   0.094*** 0.007   0.088*** 0.007 
Informal help   0.067*** 0.010   0.064*** 0.010 
Professional participation     0.094*** 0.012 
Male   0.009** 0.004   0.006 0.004 
Married 
 -0.006 0.006  -0.006 0.006 
Separated 
 -0.001 0.013  -0.002 0.012 
Divorced 
 -0.016 0.011  -0.015 0.011 
Widowed 
 -0.020 0.013  -0.016 0.013 
Age   0.000 0.000   0.000 0.000 
Low secondary edu   0.025** 0.012   0.024** 0.012 
Secondary edu   0.046*** 0.011   0.043*** 0.011 
University edu   0.081*** 0.020   0.068*** 0.019 
Household size -0.004* 0.002 -0.004* 0.002 
Children 0 - 2 -0.016** 0.008 -0.016** 0.008 
Children 3 - 5 -0.010 0.008 -0.008 0.008 
Children 6 - 15  
  0.001 0.004   0.001 0.004 
Children 16 - 24 
  0.002 0.005   0.002 0.003 
Good health 
 -0.007 0.005  -0.008 0.005 
Homeowner 
 0.017*** 0.004  0.017*** 0.005 
Labour experience   0.001* 0.000   0.001 0.000 
Permanent contract  -0.004 0.007  -0.004 0.007 
Firm size     
> 10 and < 20 employees - 0.001 0.006 - 0.002 0.006 
> 19 and < 50 employees   0.006 0.007   0.005 0.007 
> 49 employees    0.012** 0.005   0.011** 0.005 
Job-Professional   0.018*** 0.007   0.014** 0.007 
Job-Skilled 
  0.012* 0.006   0.011* 0.006 
Change job 
  0.002 0.007   0.003 0.007 
Agriculture -0.038*** 0.009 -0.039*** 0.008 
Construction -0.014 0.009 -0.015 0.008 
Wholesale -0.014* 0.007 -0.013 0.007 
Hotels   0.003 0.014 -0.000 0.013 
Transport   0.009 0.010   0.008 0.010 
Finance   0.013 0.013   0.010 0.012 
Real estate -0.031*** 0.007 -0.031*** 0.007 
Education   0.011 0.009   0.007 0.009 
Public administration   0.001 0.008  -0.002 0.007 
Health and social work 
  0.031*** 0.010   0.022** 0.010 
Other sectors 
  0.026*** 0.010   0.021** 0.010 
Densely populated area 
 -0.024*** 0.005  -0.023*** 0.005 
Intermediate area 
 -0.015*** 0.005  -0.014*** 0.005 
North East    0.013** 0.006   0.013** 0.006 
Centre  -0.009* 0.005  -0.010* 0.005 
South  -0.017*** 0.006  -0.020*** 0.006 
Islands  -0.021** 0.007  -0.021** 0.007 
No. of observations                         14565 
0.091 
-3733.83 
14565  
R-squared                                         0.100  
Log Likelihood                             -3681.38  
